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Abstract
We present a detailed analysis of assumptions that J. Bell used to
show that local realism contradicts QM. We find that Bell’s viewpoint
on realism is nonphysical, because it implicitly assume that observed
physical variables coincides with ontic variables (i.e., these variables
before measurement). The real physical process of measurement is
a process of dynamical interaction between a system and a measure-
ment device. Therefore one should check the adequacy of QM not to
“Bell’s realism,” but to adaptive realism (chameleon realism). Drop-
ping Bell’s assumption we are able to construct a natural represen-
tation of the EPR-Bohm correlations in the local (adaptive) realistic
approach.
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1 Introduction
1.1 “No-go” theorems
During the last 70 years the understanding of QM was highly improved
by wide debate on various “no–go” theorems, e.g., von Neumann, Kochen–
Specker, Bell, see [1], [2]. The latter one really beats all records on publica-
tions, citations, discussions and controversies, see [3]–[5] for recent debates.
We emphasize that as any mathematical theorem a “no–go” theorem is based
on a number of mathematical assumptions. And adequacy of a mathematical
assumption to physical reality should be the subject of very careful investi-
gation. For example, J. Bell criticized strongly some assumptions of the von
Neumann, Jauch-Piron, and Gleason “no–go” theorems [2]. Some assump-
tions of Bell’s theorem were also strongly criticized, see e.g. [3]–[18].
1.2 Probabilistic and quantum contextualities
In particular, it was pointed out that the proof of Bell’s inequality is based
on the implicit use of a single Kolmogorov probability space, see Accardi
[7]–[9], Khrennikov [11]–[14], Hess and Philipp [17]. We can call such an
assumption probabilistic non–contextuality. By probabilistic contextuality we
understand dependence of probability on experimental settings. This notion
differs essentially from the conventional notion of quantum contextuality [2].
We recall that quantum contextuality is defined as follows: the result of
measurement of an observable a depends on another measurement on an
observable b, although these two observables commute with each other [2]. It
should be emphasized that property of locality is a special case of quantum
non-contexuality.
We now compare conventional quantum contextuality and probabilistic
one. In some special cases one can obtain probabilistic contextuality from
quantum contextuality. However, probabilistic contextuality need not be
induced by the quantum one:
The probability distribution can be dependent on both (commuting) observ-
ables even if the result of measurement of an observable a does not depend
on another measurement on observable b.
2
2 Realistic models violating Bell’s inequality
Many authors studied different probabilistically contextual models which vi-
olate Bell’s inequality. In particular, the efficiency of detectors loophole as
well as more general the fair sampling loophole, see e.g. [19]- [25] for these
loopholes, are just special forms of probabilistic contextuality. In the lat-
ter cases different Kolmogorov spaces correspond to different ensembles of
particles created through selections corresponding to various experimental
settings. By choosing observables a, b and c, d in the EPR-Bohm framework1
we select two different sub-ensembles Λa,b and Λc,d. Fair sampling assumption
means that restrictions of the probability P (originally defined on the com-
plete space Λ of hidden variables) onto sub-ensembles Λa,b and Λc,d coincide:
P |Λa,b = P |Λc,d (1)
This is a special case of probabilistic non-contextuality. And unfair sampling
means that the coincidence condition (1) is violated for some experimental
settings. This is a special case of probabilistic contextuality.
We remark that in the probabilistic contextual approach one can derive
generalizations of Bell’s inequality which are not violated for quantum co-
variations [11]–[14].
2.1 Physical origin of probabilistic contextuality
Thus mathematically everything is clear: by dropping the assumption on
probabilistic non–contextuality and assuming that different experimental set-
tings induce different probability spaces it is possible to violate Bell’s inequal-
ity. But the physical origin of probabilistic contextuality is a problem of huge
complexity. In all conventional models probabilistic contextuality is induced
either by quantum contextuality or by losses of particles2 On the other hand,
we do not know any natural physical explanation of quantum contextuality,
besides nonlocality.
1Here a and b as well as c and d are orientations of two spatially separated polarization
beam splitters.
2E.g., efficiency of detectors, fair sampling, and time–window loopholes [19]–[25], induce
losses of particles: a part of the original ensemble should disappear. We agree that losses
of particles is the important problem. However, we do not think that this is the essence
of Bell’s argument. We agree with experimenters that such losses of particles can be
considered merely as a technological problem. One of the authors would like to thank
Alain Aspect and Gregor Weihs for discussions on this problem during Va¨xjo¨ conferences.
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2.2 Chameleon effect
However, there exists a model in that probabilistic contextuality (i.e., de-
pendence of probabilities on experimental settings) can be produced without
losses of particles. Moreover, in that model probabilistic contextuality is not
a consequence of the quantum contextuality and hence the model is local.
This is the chameleon model which is described in detail [7]–[9]. In these
papers Bell’s definition of realism was criticized and there was proposed a
new approach to realistic models, namely, adaptive realism. In the chameleon
model one could not identify results of measurements with ontic variables
(i.e., preexisting before measurement). Suppose a particle has some property,
say spin. At the ontic level spin is characterized by some parameter σ. Can
one assert that precisely this parameter is obtained as the result of a spin–
measurement? Definitely not! Any measurement is a complicated process
of interaction of a microscopic system with a measurement device. Finally
we cannot say that we obtain the ontic parameter σ, but only the observed
spin, say S. We emphasize that QM as about S and not about σ (as N. Bohr
pointed out in many occasions QM is not about reality as it is, but about
the results of measurements).
How does the result of measurement S arise? This is the result of dynam-
ical process of interaction of a system and a measurement device. In such an
approach there as nothing against realism. However, this is the adaptive (or
chameleon) realism (which is not at all realism of balls having once and for
ever determined color).
The chameleon effect simply states that, since dynamics is determined by
the variable subjected to measurement, we obtain probability distributions
depending on experimental settings. Thus the chameleon approach implies
probabilistic contextuality, hence, the possibility of violation of Bell’s inequal-
ity. Nevertheless, dynamics of measurements can be completely local. Let
a and b be two quantum observables represented by commuting operators.
Then there are two different dynamical systems corresponding to the a and
b-measurements, respectively. In general, they do not depend on each other.
Therefore the chameleon effect induces probabilistic contextuality, but not
at all quantum contextuality.
Finally, we remark that we question neither Bell’s theorem as a mathe-
matical result nor experimental violation of Bell’s inequality. We question
the adequacy of Bell’s realistic model (which he used to confront classical and
quantum physics) to the physical situation. We show that by rejecting two
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basic implicit assumptions in Bell’s definition of a realistic model, namely
a) non-adaptive realism of observables;
b) the range coincidence hypothesis,
we can construct a model with hidden variables which reproduces pre-
cisely the EPR–Bohm correlations.
3 Forward and backward Kolmogorov equa-
tions
Our further considerations generalize the well known dynamical scheme for
statistical states and variables associated with the diffusion process. There-
fore we recall the standard scheme. Let x(s) be a diffusion process. To
simplify considerations, we consider at the beginning the state space X = R,
the real line. We set
p(s, x, t, y) = P (x(t) = y|x(s) = x)
We consider the probability measure (statistical state describing an ensemble
of particles)
p(s, t, y) =
∫
p(s, x, t, y)p0(x)dx, (2)
where p0(x) is the density of the initial probability distribution on the state
space. This probability satisfies to the forward Kolmogorov equation:
∂p(s, t, y)
∂t
= L(p(s, t, y)) , (3)
where the generator of diffusion is given by
L(p)(t, y) =
1
2
∂2
∂y2
[σ2(t, y)p(t, y)]−
∂
∂y
[a(t, y)p(t, y)] . (4)
Here a(t, y) and σ(t, y) are the drift and diffusion coefficients, respectively.
We note that in physics (3) is known as the Fokker–Planck equation. The
evolution equation (3) is completed by the initial condition:
lim
t↓s
p(s, t, y) = p0(y) (5)
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Let us now consider the corresponding dynamics of functions. We set
f(s, τ, x) =
∫
g(y)p(s, x, τ, y)dy (6)
Then this function satisfies to the backward Kolmogorov equation:
∂f
∂s
(s, τ, x) = W (f(s, τ, x)) (7)
where the operator W which is conjugate to the generator L is given by
W (f)(s, x) = −
1
2
σ2(s, x)
∂2f(s, x)
∂x2
− a(s, x)
∂
∂x
f(s, x) . (8)
The evolution equation (7) is completed not by initial condition, but by the
“final condition”:
lim
s↑τ
f(s, τ, x) = g(x)
We emphasize this crucial difference between the equations for statistical
states (probabilities) and physical variables (functions on the configuration
space). The former is a forward equation and the latter is a backward equa-
tion. By knowing a probability distribution p0(y) at the initial instance of
time s = t0 we can find it at any t ≥ t0: p(t0, t, y). By knowing a physical
variable g(y) at the end of evolution t = τ we can reconstruct it at the initial
instance of time t0 : f(t0, τ, x).
We remark that∫
f(t0, τ, x)p0(x)dx =
∫ (∫
g(y)p(t0, x, τ, y)dy
)
p0(x)dx
=
∫
g(y)
(∫
p(t0, x, τ, y)p0(x)dx
)
dy =
∫
g(y)p(t0, τ, y)dy.
Since in our further considerations we will not always be able to operate al-
ways with densities, we consider just probability measures: p0(dy), p(s, t, dy)
and so on. We rewrite the forward and backward Kolmogorov equations in
the compact form:
∂p(t0, t)
∂t
= L(p(t0, t)) , p(t0, t0) = p0 ; (9)
∂f
∂s
(s, τ) = W (f(s, τ)) , f(τ, τ) = g (10)
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We have the following conjugation condition:∫
f(t0, τ, x)p0(dx) =
∫
g(y)p(t0, τ, dy) (11)
or ∫
f(t0, τ, x)p(t0, t0, dy) =
∫
f(τ, τ, x)p(t0, τ, dx) (12)
We remark that only one quantity, either a probability measure or a function,
is known in each side of this equality.
The Cauchy problem (9) induces the dynamical system Vt0,t in the space
of probability measures:
p(t0, t) = Vt0,t(p0) , (13)
and the (backward) Cauchy problem (10) induces the dynamical system Us,τ
in the space of functions:
f(s, τ) = Us,τ (g) (14)
These dynamical systems are conjugate:∫
Ut0,τ(g)(x)p0(dx) =
∫
g(x)Vt0,τ (p0)(dx) (15)
4 Classical statistical model with the chameleon
effect
Denote by Λ the state space of physical systems under consideration. We
also consider statistical states describing ensembles of systems. They are
represented by probability measures on Λ. Physical variables are represented
by functions f : Λ → R. The average of a variable f with respect to a
statistical state p is given by
〈f〉p =
∫
Λ
f(λ)p(dλ) (16)
Dynamics of a statistical state is given by a dynamical system Vt0,t in the
space of probability measures. Dynamics of a physical variable is given by a
dynamical system Us,τ in the space of functions.
We no longer assume that these dynamics are generated by a diffusion
(not even a Markov process). The Vt0,t and Us,τ are two general dynamics.
The only condition coupling them is the conjugation condition (15).
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We emphasize that Vt0,t is the forward dynamics: by knowing the initial
statistical state, p0, we can find it at any instant of time t: p(t0, t) = Vt0,t(p0).
In contrast, Us,τ is the backward dynamics: by knowing the final physical
variable fτ (x) = g(x), we can reconstruct it for the t = t0: f(t0, τ, x) =
Ut0,τ (g)(x). This was the well known story. The chameleon story starts
when one wants to describe processes of measurements.
Suppose that we would like to present classical statistical (but dynamical!)
description of the process of measurement of an observable a. Here a is just
a label to denote a class of measurement devices. In QM we use self–adjoint
operators as such labels.
In the chameleon model of measurement the basic assumption is that
dynamics V and U depend on the observable a :
Vt0,t ≡ V
a
t0,t
, Us,τ ≡ U
a
s,τ . (17)
This is a very natural assumption: any measurement device changes dynam-
ics. Suppose that initially there was prepared an ensemble of systems with
the probability distribution p0(λ). Then in the process of the a–measurement
p0(λ) evolves according to the dynamics V
a.
We assume that the process of measurement takes the finite interval of
time τ . Thus at that moment the probability distribution becomes pτ (λ)
(which is, of course, depends on a).
The physical variable fat (λ) evolves according to the dynamics U
a. We
do not know the initial (ontic) physical variable fat0(λ). This is a hidden
physical variable – an ontic property of systems before the a–measurement
starts. In our model a particle has the ontic position, momentum, spin and
so on. But it would be very naive to expect (as J. Bell did) to measure
directly fat0(λ). We measure the result of evolution, namely, f
a
τ (λ). The
latter variables are the results of measurements. QM is, in fact, about such
variables. But, in contrast to the chameleon model, QM does not permit the
functional representation of observables.
We repeat again that dynamics for variables is a backward dynamics.
Such a mathematical description is totally adequate to the physical exper-
imental situation. We do not know the initial variable fat0(λ), but only the
final (observed) variables faτ (λ).
We can reconstruct fat0(λ) from the observed quantity f
a
τ (λ). But we
never know fat0(λ) from the very beginning. Therefore we are not able to
construct faτ (λ) and hence predict the result of measurement.
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We have two types of averages:
(CL) The ontic (“classical”) averages are given by
〈fa〉CL ≡ 〈f
a
t0
〉p0 =
∫
Λ
fat0(λ)p0(dλ) ; (18)
(OB) The observational averages (in particular, the quantum ones) are given
by
〈fa〉OB ≡ 〈f
a
τ 〉paτ =
∫
faτ (λ)p
a
τ (dλ) . (19)
As a consequence of the conjugation condition (11), these averages coincide:
〈fa〉CL = 〈f
a〉OB (20)
Thus one can either consider the average with respect to the initial prob-
ability distribution: 〈fa〉CL, but the f
a be the ontic variable and not the
observed one, or the average of the observed physical variable, 〈fa〉OB, but
in this case the initial probability distribution p0 could not be used. In the
latter case one should consider the probability we assure paτ that depends on
a.
In the special case of quantum measurements the (OB) gives the quan-
tum average and the average (CL) can be called prequantum. In the model
under consideration we assume that the quantum and prequantum averages
coincide. Recently there was proposed a model, Prequantum Classical Sta-
tistical Field Theory, producing a prequantum average which coincides with
the quantum one only approximately, see [26]–[29].
Finally we remark that if faτ takes, e.g., the values {±1}, then there will
be no reasons to assume that fa0 takes the same values.
4.1 The range of values coincidence hypothesis
Recently it was paid attention, see [26]–[29], to another problem in Bell’s
definition of realism [2]. This is the range of values coincidence problem:
A priori there are no reasons to assume that the range of values of an
ontic physical variable (say ontic spin σ) should coincide with the range of
values of the corresponding observables (say measured spin S).
As was already pointed out, the process of measurement is the process of
interaction of a microscopic system and a measurement device. Therefore it
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is not surprising that the σ can be transformed into a different value S. In
fact, by its very definition σ is unobservable in principle.
Denote by λ the state of a system, the “hidden variable”. Both σ and S
are functions of λ : σ = σ(λ), S = S(λ). But there are no reasons to assume
that
Range σ = Range S . (21)
Thus one should sharply distinguish ontic and observed variables. The con-
dition that the observed spin S = ±1 does not imply that the ontic spin σ
(which is in principle unobservable) also takes values ±1.
4.2 Spectral postulate
We point out that we do not want to drop the standard spectral postulate
of QM. By this postulate the range of vales of a quantum observable coin-
cides with the spectral set of the corresponding self-adjoint operator. This
postulate was confirmed by all quantum experiments and it could not be
questioned. In our approach the range of values of say the observed spin S
coincides with the spectral set of the corresponding quantum operator. We
simply remark that there is no reasons to expect that the range of values of
say the ontic spin σ should coincide with this spectral set.
4.3 Classical reproduction of the EPR-Bohm correla-
tions
In fact, we need not to consider a new classical adaptive (chameleon) model
which would give us the EPR-Bohm correlations. By taking into account the
analysis of measurement process which was performed in the present paper
(and especially the evident possibility of violation of the range of values
coincidence hypothesis) we can now use the well known model of Accardi
and Regoli [10].
Conclusion: The common conclusion that Bell’s arguments imply in-
compatibility of local realism and the quantum formalism is based on a rather
naive understanding of coupling between ontic reality (i.e., reality as it is
when nobody make measurements) and the observational reality. By consid-
ering the adaptive measurement framework (based on the chameleon effect)
we showed that in fact local realism can peacefully coexist with the quantum
formalism.
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